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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PINT, PFOR, LY, EG

SUBJECT: QADHAFI, SADAT, REVOLUTION AND UNITY

REF: TRIPOLI 0923

SUMMARY: AT THIS POINT THE SCENE MAY BE DESCRIBED AS "BACK TO SQUARE ONE." FOR READERS OF REFTEL, THE BASIC PICTURE IS DEJA VU. NEW ELEMENTS ARE THAT GOE/LARG DIFFERENCES OVER HOW TO PROCEED TO UNITY ARE NOW IN THE OPEN, AND THAT QADHAFI'S CAVALCADE CAPER HAS PROBABLY LEFT SOME HARD FEELINGS ON BOTH SIDES. PREDICTIONS AS TO WHAT WILL HAPPEN SEPTEMBER 1 ARE AS DIFFICULT AS EVER, BUT FURTHER INSTABILITY IS A SURE THING. END SUMMARY.

1. THE TORRENT OF WORDS FROM SADAT AND QADHAFI ON JULY 23, AND THE REVOLATIONS BEFORE THAT IN CONNECTION WITH THE LIBYAN MOTORCADE, HAVE REVEALED TO THE PUBLIC A FULL RANGE OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO GOVTS ON HOW TO PROCEED TO UNITY. BRIEFLY, QADHAFI SAYS HE EXPECTED COMPLETE UNITY BY SEPTEMBER ONE 1973, WHEREAS SADAT REVEALS HE WANTS ONLY SOME SYMBOLIC STEPS BY THEN AND A SYSTEMATIC DEVELOPMENT OF UNITY THEREAFTER, CONDITION-CONFIDENTIAL

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ED ON SUBSTANTIVE AGREEMENT STEP BY STEP. EACH STILL

ARGUES THAT HIS APPROACH ALONE WILL LAY A FIRM FOUNDATION FOR UNITY. PROBABLY THIS DIFFERENCE OF APPROACH EXISTED FROM THE BEGINNING -- QADHAFI URGING HIS APOLCALYPTIC VISION BASED ON GENERALITIES, SADAT URGING THE NEED FOR PRAGMATIC TASKS BASED ON PARTICULAR PROBLEMS. BUT HITHERTO SUCH DIFFERENCES WERE PAPERED OVER AND IT IS NOW CLEAR THERE WAS SOME MUTUAL DECEPTION INVOLVED. QADHAFI COULD CLAIM WITH SOME JUSTICE THAT PUBLICLY HE WAS BAMBOOZLED, AS GOE NOW WANTS IN EFFECT TO POSTPONE REAL UNITY AT LEAST A YEAR. ON OTHER HAND, SADAT CAN AND DOES CLAIM WITH JUSTICE THAT OVER PAST YEAR QADHAFI HAS UPPED THE ANTE, E.G., WITH HIS POPULAR REVOLUTION WHICH HE EXPECTS EGYPT TO SWALLOW. THIS IS INDEED A BIT MUCH.

- 2. JULY 25 EGYPTIAN CHARGE AND I DISCUSSED THIS SITUATION PRIVATELY, AT A SPORTS CLUB. HE VOLUNTEERED THAT NUB OF PROBLEM FOR GOE IS THE POPULAR REVOLUTION AND ITS THREAT TO THE EGYPTIAN SYSTEM: "COMMUNISTS AND MUSLIM BROTHERS WOULD TAKE ADVANTAGE OF ANY POPULAR COMMITTEES, AND WE SIMPLY CANNOT AFFORD IT." HE THOUGHT THE OTHER PROBLEMS POSED BY QADHAFI'S DEMANDS, SPECIFICALLY SHARIA LAWS AND "THE BATTLE", COULD BE HANDLED RATHER EASILY, BUT SAW NO SOLUTION TO THE DEMAND FOR A REVOLUTION. HE ALSO EXPRESSED CONCERN AT RECEPTION OF THE VISIT TO LIBYA NEXT WEEK OF A HIGH LEVEL GOE DELEGATION TO DISCUSS UNITY STEPS. IT COULD RESULT IN "FURTHER MISUNDERSTANDINGS" AS THE LIBYANS WERE VERY DIFFICULT PEOPLE TO TALK TO. (COMMENT: AMEN*)
- 3. TALKING ABOUT UNITY ON JULY 23, THE THINGS SADAT AND QADHAFI AGREED UPON WERE ITS DESIRABILITY, ITS NECESSITY, ITS INEVITABILITY, ETC. THEREAFTER THEIR REMARKS RAPIDLY DIVERGED. QADHAFI DWELT ON THEIR DIFFERENCES AT MUCH GREATER LENGTH. HE LISTED THEM ROUGHLY IN THE FOLLOWING ORDER (REFERENCES ARE TO THE "ADDS" TO FBIS M231725): THE POPULAR REVOLUTION (11TH, 12TH AND 13TH ADDS), SHARIA LAW (14TH), THE BATTLE (10TH, 15TH 17TH), POLICIES TOWARD "REACTIONARY" REGIMES (18TH), AND A CHARTER FOR NATIONAL ACTION (18TH, 19TH). AS A RULE HE SHOWED NO INCLINATION TO COMPROMISE AND REPEATEDLY SAID "I WILL NOT ACCEPT A POSITION OF COMMAND" IN A UNITARY STATE WHERE FOR EXAMPLE "REACTION CONFIDENTIAL

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COULD BREATHE" -- THOUGH IN THIS CASE HE WENT ON TO SAY HE WOULD ACCEPT A TRUCE WITH REACTIONARY ARAB REGIMES FOR THE SAKE OF THE BATTLE, AND IN THE CASE OF THE EGYPTIAN NATIONAL ACTION CHARTER HE WOULD ACCEPT IT IF REVISED (TO BE REVOLUTIONARY). "UNITY MUST BE ACHIEVED EVEN THROUGH A CIVIL WAR OR THE LIKE."

- 4. THEREAFTER QADHAFI BEGAN TALKING OF HIS OWN FUTURE: "WHAT I HAVE SAID IS AN ATTEMPT TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE FOUNDATIONS ON WHICH A UNITY STATE COULD BE BUILT. BUT -- AND THIS MUST BE CLEAR -- THEY ARE NOT IN ANY WAY CONDITIONS FOR UNITY....THESE THINGS COULD MAKE ME PARTICIPATE IN THE COMMAND OR THEY COULD MAKE ME REFRAIN... BEFORE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF UNITY, I COULD FIX MY ATTITUDE CLEARLY." (IN OTHER WORDS, IF I AM NOT SATISFIED I WILL NOT PLAY BALL.) THEN HE WAFFLED, SAYING: "IF THE POSITION OF THE UNIFIED STATE IS A POSITION THAT CAN MAKE ME ACCEPT A PART OF THE RESPONSIBILITY IN IT. THEN I MAY STAY. THIS SHOULD BE CLEAR." (MAYBE IT SHOULD BE, BUT IT IS NOT, EITHER IN TERMS OF ARISTOTELIAN LOGIC OR EUCLIDEAN GEOMETRY.) FINALLY HE SAID, "I WILL RETURN TO MY POST AND WILL DETERMINE MY STAND AFTER UNITY." (THIS IS PLAIN ENOUGH EXCEPT THAT THERE IS NO DATE.)
- 5. THE FUTURE IS THEREFORE VERY MUCH IN THE AIR AND WE DOUBT IF ANYONE KNOWS WHAT WILL HAPPEN SEPTEMBER ONE, OR LATER. AFTER MORE THAN SIX WEEKS OF CONTINUAL TALKS AND REPEATED BRINKSMANSHIP, IT REMAINS THAT NOTHING HAS BEEN SETTLED. CERTAINLY THE SAME TENSIONS BETWEEN QADHAFI AND SADAT, AND PROBABLY BETWEEN QADHAFI AND THE REST OF THE RCC, STILL EXIST. NO PREDICTION OF THE OUTCOME OF THESE TENSIONS IS POSSIBLE, WE BELIEVE, EXCEPT THAT FURTHER INSTABILITY IS IN STORE. ONE POSSIBILITY TO LOOK FOUT FOR, HOWEVER, IS SOME ACTIVE UNDERMINING OF THE CENTRAL CHARACTERS OF THE SCENE, BY EACH OTHER. AS QADHAFI SAID JULY 23, "WHAT HAMPERS ARAB UNITY AND HAS ACTUALLY HAMPERED IT THROUGHOUT IS THE DISEASE FROM WHICH THE ARABS ARE SUFFERING: LOVE OF POWER". AND "SINCE THE TWO COUNTRIES ARE GOING TO UNITE. ONE MUST RESIGN" (HIS PRSIDENCY). QADHAFI MAY BE THE FIRST TO GO, BUT MEANWHILE HE SHOULD NOT BE COUNTED OUT. CONFIDENTIAL

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